This paper proposes a group signature scheme with efficient membership revocation. Though group signature schemes with efficient membership revocation based on a dynamic accumulator were proposed, the previous schemes force a member to change his secret key whenever he makes a signature. Furthermore, for the modification, the member has to obtain a public membership information of O( n N) bits, where n is the length of the RSA modulus and N is the total number of joining members and removed members. In our scheme, the signer needs no modification of his secret, and the public membership information has only K bits, where K is the maximal number of members. Then, for middle-scale groups with the size that is comparable to the RSA modulus size (e.g., up to about 1000 members for 1024 bit RSA modulus), the public membership information is a single small value only, while the signing/verification also remains efficient.
Introduction

Backgrounds
A group signature scheme allows a group member to anonymously sign a message on behalf of a group, where, in addition, a membership manager (MM) and an opening manager (OM) participate. MM has the authority to add a user into the group, and OM has the authority to revoke the anonymity of a signature. Since the scheme allows us to anonymously verify user's ownership of some privilege, it is applied to various cryptographic protocols such as anonymous e-cash [19] , bidding [21] , and credential system [9] . On the other hand, various group signature schemes are also proposed [1] - [3] , [7] , [8] , [10] , [14] , [22] , [24] , with the improvements of efficiency, security and convenience. The breakthrough is achieved in [8] . In this scheme, the efficiency of the public key and signatures is independent from the group size, and furthermore an entity's joining has no influence on other member. The followers [1] - [3] , [7] , [10] , [22] , [24] also have these good characteristics. In both the efficiency and the provably unforgeability, the state-of-theart scheme is due to Ateniese et al. [1] , followed by [3] , [10] , * The preliminary version of this paper was presented at ACISP2004 [20] .
a) E-mail: nakanisi@cne.okayama-u.ac.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.5.1224 [22] , [24] . The essential idea in this type of schemes is the use of the membership certificate. MM issues a membership certificate to the joining member, where the certificate is MM's digital signature. Then, the group signature is a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of this certificate. Since the group signature has no relation with the other members, this idea provides the above good characteristics. However, on the other hand, this idea prevents a member from being easily removed from the group, since it is hard to erase the issued membership certificate in the removed member's environment without physical device's help. One plausible solution is to reissue certificates of all the members except the removed one by changing MM's public key of the digital signature, as [3] . However, the loads of unrelated members are too large.
Previous Works
Recently, some schemes [3] , [7] , [10] , [22] , [24] deal with this problem of the membership revocation. In the first scheme [7] , a signer has to prove that his certificate is different from all the certificates of removed members in the zero-knowledge fashion. However, this proof requires exponentiations whose number is linear in the number of removed members. For dynamic groups (i.e., users often join in and are removed from the groups), this forces signers' heavy loads.
In [3] , [22] , another approach against this problem is adopted. In this approach, a group signature includes a value applied by a one-way function from the certificate. The revocation of a member is to publish the certificate of the member. This scheme also provides a method to prevent the link between the published certificate and signatures before revoked. However, the verification cost w.r.t. exponentiations is linear in the number of removed members, though the signing cost is independent.
In [10] , an elegant approach using a dynamic accumulator is proposed, which is followed by [24] with the efficiency improvement. The accumulator allows MM to hash a large set of effective certificates into a short value. In the group signature, the signer has to prove that own certificate is accumulated into the short value. Therefore, signing/verification is efficient, since the computation cost is independent from the number of the removed members. However, whenever making a signature, the signer has to modify a secret key for the accumulator. Although the modifiCopyright c 2005 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers cation is performed efficiently w.r.t. exponentiations, it requires certificates of joining members and removed members since the last time he signed. To obtain the certificates, the signer must fetch the certificates of all joining members and removed members from a public directory with the list of the certificates, as pointed out in [3] . This is because fetching a part of the list can reveal the information to trace the signer. The fetched public membership certificates has O( n N) bits in total, where n is the length of the RSA modulus and N is the total number of joining members and removed members, since each certificate has about n bits. For example, in case of N = 1000 and n = 1024, the total size of the certificates amounts to more than 1 M bits. This public membership information should be modified in real-time or in a short interval, and may be fetched frequently by all signers. Therefore, this communication cost is vast, and thus those schemes are not complete solutions for efficient membership revocation.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a group signature scheme with efficient membership revocation, where the public membership information has only K bits, where K is the maximal number of members. The information is only a composition of the group, where each bit indicates that the membership of a member is valid, that is, the member is not removed. Thus, the information includes no certificate. Then, for middlescale groups with a size that is comparable to the RSA modulus size (e.g., up to about 1000 members for 1024 bit RSA modulus), the public membership information falls in a single value that is comparable to the modulus. Though the signing/verification in our scheme utilizes a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge w.r.t. this membership information for realizing the efficient revocation, this proof's cost has no dependency on the number of removed members, due to the public membership information with the reasonable size. Therefore, the signing/verification remains efficient. Furthermore, at each revocation, MM only has to perform a simple bit operation and the signer needs no modification of own secret key. On the other hand, for larger groups, the proposed scheme requires the signing/verification cost related to O(K/ n ). Note that, for such larger groups, the accumulator-based schemes also have a problem of enormous public information with the size O( n N).
Model
We show a model of group signature scheme with membership revocation. 
Preliminaries
Assumptions and Notations
Our scheme is based on the strong RSA assumption [17] and decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, as well as the state-of-the-art group signature scheme due to Ateniese et al. [1] .
Assumption 1 (Strong RSA assumption): Let n = pq be an RSA modulus, and let G be a cyclic subgroup of Z * n . Then, for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, the probability that A on inputs n and z ∈ G outputs e ∈ Z s.t. e > 1 and u ∈ G satisfying z = u e (mod n) is negligible.
Assumption 2 (DDH assumption): Let G be a cyclic group generated by g ∈ G with order u. Then, the following
where a, b, c are uniformly chosen from Z u , and
where a, b are uniformly chosen from Z u , are computationally indistinguishable.
Intuitively, the DDH assumption means the infeasibility to decide whether the discrete logs of two random elements in G to the random bases are the same. When n = pq is an RSA modulus for safe primes p, q (i.e., p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, and p, q, p , q are prime), let QR(n) be the set of quadratic residues modulo n, that is, the cyclic subgroup of Z * n generated by an element of order p q . As well as the scheme due to Ateniese et al., the security of our scheme is based on the above both assumptions (i.e., strong RSA assumption and DDH assumption) on QR(n). Notations: Let [a, a+d] be an integer interval of all integers int such that a ≤ int ≤ a + d, for an integer a and a positive integer d. We additionally use notation [a, a + d) for all int such that a ≤ int < a + d, and notation (a, a + d) for all int such that a < int < a + d. Let ∈ R denote the uniform random selection. Hereafter, we omit notation mod n for operations on QR(n).
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signature Scheme for Blocks of Messages
Our group signature scheme is based on the ordinary (not group) signature due to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [11] under the strong RSA assumption, which is an extension from the signature used as a membership certificate in Ateniese et al.'s scheme [1] .
Key generation: Let n , m , s , e , be security parameters s.t. s ≥ n + m + , e ≥ m + 2 and is sufficiently large (e.g., 160). The secret key consists of safe primes p, q, and the public key consists of n = pq of length n and
where L is the number of blocks.
s ) and a random prime e from (2 
Commitment Scheme
A commitment scheme on QR(n) under the strong RSA assumption is proposed by Damgård and Fujisaki [15] (The original is due to Fujisaki and Okamoto [17] ). The following is a slightly modified version due to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [11] .
Key generation:
The public key consists of a secure RSA modulus n of length n , h from QR(n), and g from the group generated by h. Commitment: For the public key, input x of length x , and randomness r ∈ R Z n , the commitment C is computed as C = g x h r .
Lemma 2:
This commitment scheme is statistically hiding and computationally binding, under the strong RSA assumption [11] .
Signatures of Knowledge
As main building blocks, we use signatures converted by socalled Fiat-Shamir heuristic [16] from honest-verifier zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge, which are called signatures of knowledge. We abbreviate them as S PKs. The S PKs are secure in the random oracle model [5] , if the underlying interactive protocols are the zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. The S PKs are denoted as
which means the signature for message m by a signer with the secret knowledge α, β, . . . satisfying the relation R(α, β, . . .). In this notation, the Greek letters denote the signer's secret knowledge, and other parameters denote public values. The proofs used in our scheme show the relations among secret representations of elements in QR(n) with unknown order. Note that a representation of C ∈ QR(n) to bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n) is a tuple (x 1 , . . . ,
. The simplest S PK is one proving the knowledge of a discrete log of an element in QR(n). This is converted from a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in [17] . Furthermore, this S PK can be also extended into the S PK of a representation [15] , [17] . We furthermore use the S PK of representations with equal parts, S PK of a representation with parts in intervals [6] , [12] , and S PK of a representation with a non-negative part [6] . The following is notations of the S PKs, whose detail constructions are described in Appendix A.
S PK of representation: An S PK proving the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ QR(n) to the bases g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n) on message m is denoted as
. S PK of representations with equal parts: An S PK proving the knowledge of representations of C, C ∈ QR(n) to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n) on message m, where the representations include equal values as parts, is denoted as S PK{(α 1 , . . . , α u ) :
. . , t} refer to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t , and indices j 1 , . . .
. . , u} refer to the secrets α 1 , . . . , α u . This S PK is easily obtained by the similar way to the S PK for groups with the known order (e.g., [12] ).
S PK of representation with parts in intervals:
An S PK proving the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ QR(n) to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n) on message m, where the i-th part lies in an interval [a,
. For this S PK, two types are known. One is due to Boudot [6] , where it is assured that the knowledge exactly lies in the interval. However, this S PK needs the computations of about 10 normal S PKs of a representation. Another type appears in [12] for example (originally, [13] ), where the integer the prover knows in fact lies in the narrower interval than the interval the proved knowledge lies in. However, its efficiency is comparable to that of the normal S PK.
where˜ is a security parameter derived from the challenge size and from the security parameter controlling the statistical zero-knowledge-ness (in practice, ≈ 160). The S PK for a knowledge in an interval can be easily extended into the S PK for two or more knowledges in intervals, such as S PK{(α, β) :
. In this paper, for simplicity, we describe our scheme using the former protocol [6] , since a design using the latter efficient protocol must address the expansion of the intervals. Although this expansion can be easily addressed as in [11] , it may disturb a clear grasp of the essence of our scheme. However, in the later efficiency consideration, we estimate the efficiency of our scheme using the efficient S PK of [12] . The efficient version of our scheme is summarized in Appendix B.
S PK of representation with non-negative part: An S PK proving the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ QR(n) to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n) on message m, where the i-th part is not negative integer, is denoted as
As for this, since we need to prove that the knowledge is exactly 0 and over, we adopt the S PK due to Boudot [6] .
The interactive versions of these S PKs are also used. The interactive ones are denoted by substituting PK for S PK, such as PK{α : y = g α }.
Proposed Scheme
Idea
The foundation is that a group signature is an S PK of a membership certificate issued by MM. For simplicity, in the following, we first omit the mechanism to trace the signer. Ateniese et al. [1] propose the state-of-the-art group signature scheme that is most efficient and provably coalitionresistant against an adaptive adversary. In the registration, MM computes an ordinary signature on a secret x chosen by a joining member, denoted by S ign(x), and MM issues the member S ign(x) as the membership certificate. Then, the member can compute his group signature on message
As the extension, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [11] propose an ordinary signature scheme shown in Sect. 3.2, together with a PK of the signature. In the scheme, the signer can sign two blocks of messages. Then, by an interactive protocol in [11] , a receiver can obtain a signature from the signer, where one message x is known by only the receiver, but another message m is known by both. Let S ign(x, m) denote the signature on x and m. In the PK shown in [11] , the owner of the signature can prove the knowledge of the signature on the messages in the zero-knowledge fashion, such as PK{(x, m, v) : v = S ign(x, m)}. Our scheme effectively utilizes the part m to be signed in the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme for efficient membership revocation. Now, we show the idea of our scheme. Consider a public membership informationm which represents whether the membership of each member is valid or not. Letm = K−1 i=0 2 im i for K, wherem i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, concretely, bit m i is assigned to the i-th member of the group and we set m i = 1 (resp.,m i = 0) if the membership of the i-th member is valid (resp., invalid). Thus, note that in our scheme, the public membership information has only K bits, which is shorter than the previous schemes [11] , [24] .
To achieve the membership revocation in this setting, a signer who is the i-th member only has to provem i = 1 without revealing i. We adopt the S PK proving an integer relation to achieve this proof. Concretely, consider the following integer relation:
Ifm i = 1, there existm U ,m L satisfying the above relation. On the other hand, ifm i = 0, there do not exist suchm U ,m L . Thus, if the signer can prove the knowledgem U ,m L , it ensuresm i = 1, which means that the membership of the signer is valid. In the above discussion, note that 2 i−1 has to be fixed for the i-th member. In our scheme, m = 2 i−1 is embedded in the membership certificate as S ig(x, m) which is a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature. Additionally, the knowledge of the certificate and m can be proved without revealing m by the S PK. Thus, m = 2 i−1 can be fixed. By m = 2 i−1 , the above relation is rewritten as follows:
Putting everything together, the group signature on message
Note that removing the i-th member is only the computation ofm − 2 i−1 , and it is the very low cost.
Finally we mention the traceability. In the previous scheme [1] , a group signature includes an ElGamal ciphertext of the certificate v = S ign(x). The decryption leads to the signer's identity. On the other hand, in the CamenischLysyanskaya signature as a certificate, the owner of a certificate v = S ign(x, m) can compute different certificates of the same x, m. This is why the previous technique is not applied to our scheme. Thus, our group signature includes an ElGamal ciphertext of a x 1 for a public a 1 , while the owner has to register the value with MM. The decryption of the ciphertext leads to the owner's identity.
Remark 3:
In the group signature, the correctness of the ciphertext of a x 1 must be verifiable for the traceability. In case that the ElGamal encryption is used, the S PK of representations can prove the correctness. Furthermore, as such a verifiable encryption, the ElGamal encryption is the most efficient, as far as we know. This is why the ElGamal encryption is adopted.
Proposed Protocols
Setup
Let n be a security parameter. Then, MM sets up the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya scheme for L = 2, i.e., MM computes two ( n /2)-bit safe primes p, q and n = pq, and chooses a 1 , a 2 , b, c ∈ R QR(n). Furthermore, he sets up the commitment scheme on QR(n) to generate g and h. He publishes (n, a 1 , a 2 , b, c, g, h) as the public key, and keeps (p, q) as the secret key. For the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya scheme, security parameters x , m , e , s , are set s.t. s ≥ n + max( x , m ) + and e ≥ max( x , m ) + 2. To simplify the description, we introduce interval notations as follows:
. Additionally, the initial public membership informationm is set as 0.
On the other hand, OM sets up the ElGamal encryption on QR(n), i.e., OM chooses a secret key x OM ∈ R {0, 1} n and publishes the public key y = g x OM .
Join and Membership Revocation
We describe the join protocol for the i-th user (1 ≤ i ≤ K). This protocol is derived from the interactive protocol shown in [11] , as mentioned in Sect. 4.1. In our scheme, the membership certificate is (s, e, A) s.t. A e = a s c) ( 1/e mod ϕ(n)) , s ∈ R S, and e is a random prime from E, and sends (s, e, A) to U. On the other hand, the membership revocation is simple as follows: When the i-th user is removed from the group, MM publishes the new public membership informationm =m − 2 i−1 .
Sign and Verify
As mentioned in Sect. 4.1, the group signature proves the knowledge of the membership certificate for the membership information m, and the knowledgem U andm L satisfyingm =m U (2m)+m+m L and 0 ≤m L ≤ m−1. Furthermore, for the traceability, the group signature contains an ElGamal ciphertext on a x 1 and the S PK proves the correctness. The detail protocol is as follows:
, where w,w, w m , wm U , wm L , w e ∈ R Z n .
U computes the following S PK V:
S PK{(α, β, γ, δ, , ζ, η, θ, ι, κ, λ, µ, ν, ξ, o, π, ρ) :
Then, the group signature is (C
The verification of the signature is the verification of V. T 2 ) . The obtained a x 1 is linkable to the member's identity. The correctness is proved by PK{α :
Remark 4: In the above S PK, U can adopt
α = e, β = x, γ = m, δ = s, = ew, ζ = w, η =w, θ = ew, ι = w m , κ =m U , λ = wm U , µ =m L , ν = wm L , ξ = w e , o = −w m −wm L −2wm U m, π = m−1−m L , ρ = w m −wm L . As shown in Lemma 4, V proves knowledge (x, m, s, e, A,m U ,m L , w e ) such that A e = a x 1 a m 2 b s c, e ∈ E, x ∈ X, m ∈ M, T 1 = g w e , T 2 = y w e a x 1 ,m =m U (2m) + m +m L and 0 ≤m L ≤ m − 1.
Open
OM computes T 2 /T x OM 1 = a x 1 to decrypt the ElGamal ci- phertext (T 1 ,T 2 /a x 1 = T α 1 ∧ y = g α }.
Security
Our membership certificate is a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature. Thus, due to the security proof [11] , the following lemma holds: From this lemma, we can obtain the coalitionresistance by the similar proof to [11] .
Theorem 1:
Under the strong RSA assumption, the proposed scheme is coalition-resistant for the adversary who adaptively obtains valid membership certificates from MM.
Proof. Assume an adversaryF who, that is allowed to adaptively run the join protocol and obtain k membership certificates (s i , e i , A i = (a
Here, we will prove that, ifF outputs a tuple (x,m,ŝ,ê,Â) such thatÂˆe = aˆx 1 am 2 bˆsc withx ∈ X,m ∈ M,ê ∈ E and (x,m) (x i , m i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k with the non-negligible probability, the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature is existentially forgeable against an adaptive adversary F , which contradicts Lemma 3.
Let O F be the signing oracle for F . Then, F is as follows: Given the public key (n, a 1 , a 2 , b, c) of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya scheme, generate other public parameters (g, h, y,m) as usual. For (n, a 1 , a 2 , b, c, g, h, y,m) , runF . In the execution, consider the i-th join protocol run on m i . In the first step,F sends C i = a In the this simulation,F 's view is exactly the same talking with to the real MM and to the simulator. Finally,F outputs (x,m,ŝ,ê,Â) such thatÂˆe = aˆx 1 am 2 bˆsc withx ∈ X,m ∈ M,ê ∈ E and (x,m) (x i , m i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k with non-negligible probability. As F , output the same, which means that F breaks the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme.
Next, we prove the unforgeability, using the following two lemmas. Proof. Since the completeness and zero-knowledge-ness are simply shown from these properties of the underlying S PKs, only the soundness is discussed. From the S PK for predicates c = C A α (1/a 1 )
, we can extract (α, β, γ, δ, , ζ, η, θ, ξ) satisfying these predicates. From the second and third equations, the equation g αζ h αη = g h θ holds, and thus (1/g) = (1/g) αζ also holds. Therefore, a
Hence, the knowledge of (x = β, m = γ, s = δ, e = α, A = C A /g ζ , w e = ξ) such that A e = a 
we can extract (γ, ι, κ, λ, µ, ν, o) satisfying these predicates. By substituting Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) for the left hand of Eq. (4), the left hand is equal to
On the other hand, from Eq. (2), the right hand of (4) is equal
. Thus, we can obtain the equationm−γ−µ = 2κγ (mod p q ). Then, as integer equation,
should hold, since, otherwise, we can obtain an integer d satisfying p q |d to break the RSA assumption. From Eq. (5), m = κ · 2γ + γ + µ holds, where γ is m extracted from the membership certificate, and κ, µ correspond tom U ,m L , respectively.
Similarly, from the S PK for
we can extract (π, ρ) satisfying this predicate. By substituting Eqs. (1) and (3) for Eq. (6),
hold. Then, from g γ−1−µ h ι−ν = g π h ρ , γ − 1 − µ = π holds as integer equation, as discussed above. Since the S PK V proves π ≥ 0, the inequation γ − 1 − µ ≥ 0 holds and thus µ ≤ γ − 1. Furthermore, the S PK proves µ ≥ 0, and finally we obtain 0 ≤ µ ≤ γ − 1, that is, 0 ≤m L ≤ m − 1.
This lemma can be straightforwardly proved.
Theorem 2:
Under the strong RSA assumption, the proposed scheme satisfies the unforgeability.
Proof. For signing, the signer must know the certificate (s, e ∈ E, A) on x ∈ X, m ∈ M s.t. A e = a On the other hand, from Theorem 1, such a certificate is unforgeable even if valid members collude. Therefore, before signing, the signer must have conducted the join protocol with MM, which implies that the signer is a member.
In the rest, we show that a removed member with the certificate w.r.t. m = 2 i−1 cannot compute a valid S PK V. In the certificate generated by MM, m = 2 i−1 is assured. On the other hand, S PK V proves the knowledge of (m U ,m L ) such thatm =m U (2m) + m +m L and 0 ≤m L ≤ m − 1. However, Lemma 5 claims that such a knowledge does not exist, if the i-th bit inm (i.e.,m i−1 ) is 0, which implies that the member is removed. Therefore, the removed member cannot compute a valid S PK V.
Finally, we simply discuss the other requirements. The ElGamal encryption is secure based on the DDH assumption [23] . Therefore, anonymity and unlinkability hold, because of the the zero-knowledge-ness of S PK V and the secrecy of the ElGamal encryption and the commitment scheme, as well as the original group signature [1] . No framing is also satisfied, since the S PK V proves the knowledge of x, which is kept secret for others (even MM), owing to the PK in the join protocol and the S PK V. Traceability is satisfied as follows: Since V proves that (T 1 , T 2 ) is an ElGamal ciphertext of a x 1 , which is shown in Lemma 4, opening the group signature produces a x 1 . On the other hand, V proves the knowledge of the certificate A of the x, and the unforgeability of the A implies that the owner registered the a x 1 . Therefore, the a x 1 is linkable to the owner.
Efficiency
Here, we discuss the efficiency of our scheme, compared with the related schemes [1] , [10] . As mentioned before, we evaluate the more efficient version of our scheme that adopts the efficient S PK of [12] for intervals instead of inefficient Table 2 The size of the public membership information of [10] and the proposed scheme in case of N = 1000, K = 1000 and n = 1024.
Scheme Communication cost [10] 100 kbytes Ours 100 bytes S PK of [6] . Since the modification is simple, it is summarized in Appendix B.
The signing/verification cost of our scheme depends on m , i.e., K that is the maximal number of members' joining. At first, consider the case of m ≈ n . In this case, our scheme allows up to about 1000 members, if n is standard 1024. Then, the exponent length is all comparable to n , and signing and verification require 31 and 18 multiexponentiations respectively, on such an exponent length. The costs are summarized together with the other related schemes [1] , [10] in Table 1 . In the state-of-the-art scheme [1] with no revocation, signing and verification require 5 and 3 multi-exponentiations, respectively. In the accumulator based scheme [10] with revocation, signing and verification require 14 and 8 multi-exponentiations, respectively. The accumulator based scheme [24] is slightly better. However, the schemes based the accumulator require the modification of signer's secret key whenever signing, and the size of public membership information is O( n N), where N is the total number of joining members and removed members. On the other hand, our scheme needs no modification of signer's secret key, and the public membership information is onlym with the length O( n ). For example, consider the case of N, K = 1000 and n = 1024. Though the size of the public membership information in the accumulator based schemes is about 100 kbytes, the size in our scheme is about 100 bytes only. This is summarized in Table 2 .
Next, consider the case of m n , namely much more members joining than n . Then, the computation and communication costs of signing/verification in our scheme are O(K/ n ). If n = 1024, the feasible number of members' joining is the order of 1000. For such larger groups, note that the accumulator based schemes also have a serious problem: It suffers from the long public information. In case of N = 10000 and n = 1024, the size of the information amounts to more than 1 MBytes.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a group signature scheme with efficient membership revocation for middle-scale groups, where the public membership information is shorter (about 1000 bits) than the previous schemes. A future work is to adapt our scheme to larger groups with the efficiency preserved. Additionally, an open problem is to explore a provably secure scheme on the formal security definition indicated in [4] .
The introduction ofṁ = m+2 m −1 needs a modification of C m into Cṁ = gṁh w m and a modification of the S PK V as follows:
S PK{(α, β, γ, δ, , ζ, η, θ, ι, κ, λ, µ, ν, ξ, o, π, ρ) : c = C A α (1/a 1 ) β (1/a 2 ) γ (1/b) δ (1/g)
The security of V can be proved as in Sect. 5. 
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